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SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT: DEFRAUDED ISSUER HAS
PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER SECTION io(b)
IN Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp.,1 the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit joins the Courts of Appeals for the Second,2 Third'
and Ninth4 Circuits in holding that a violation of section io(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 193e and rule X-IoB-5, promulgated
thereunder, gives rise to a private right of action., In order to hold
for plaintiff in this case, however, the court was required to determine
that a defrauded seller need not have the status of "investor" to come
within the purview of section io(b) 7 of the act and that a corporation
defrauded in the issue of its own stock is a "seller" within the meaning
of rule X-ioB-5.8
I z8z F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 196o).
'Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.zd 783 (2d Cir. 1g51).
3 Slavin v. Germantown Fire Ins. Co., 174 F.zd 799 ( 3d Cir. 1949) (dictum).
'Errion v. Connell, 236 F.zd 447 ( 9 th Cir. z956) 5 Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.zd
627 ( 9 th Cir. 1953).
G48 Stat. 88i (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78 (958).
'Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), was the
first case to rule squarely on the isssue of a civil remedy under § io(b) and rule
X-ioB-5. Accord, Smith v. Bear, 237 F.2d 79 (zd Cir. 1956); Errion v. Connell,
236 F.zd 447 ( 9 th Cir. 1956) 5 Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 ( 9 th Cir. 1953);
Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., x88 F.zd 783 (2d Cir. x95i), Slavin v. Germantown
Fire Ins. Co., 174 F.2d 799 ( 3 d Cir. 1949) (dictum); Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F.
Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1955); Thiele v. Shields, 13 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. x955);
Northern Trust Co. v. Essanes Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp. 954 (N.D. Ill. 195z);
Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 8o8 (D. Del. i95x ) ; Robinson v. Difford,
92 F. Supp. 145 (E.D. Pa. 195o); Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y.
1949) ; Hawkins v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, 85 F. Supp. 104 (W.D.
Ark. 1949)5 Stella v. Kaiser, 82 F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); Montague v.
Electronic Corp. of America, 76 F. Supp. 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); Fry v. Schumaker,
83 F. Supp. 476 (E.D. Pa. 1947); Acker v. Schulte, 74 F. Supp. 683 (S.D.N.Y.
194-7).
' "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors." 48 Stat. 891 (193t)
, 
15 U.S.C. § 7 8j(b)(1958).
' "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
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Plaintiff, trustee in bankruptcy for Consolidated American In-
dustries, Inc., brought suit for damages and an accounting in the Middle
District of Alabama alleging that defendants had fraudulently obtained,
Consolidated's stock in a scheme perpetrated through the use of inter-
state communications.9 Plaintiff sought to establish by these allegations
a violation of the Securities Exchange Act which would entitle him to
extra-territorial service of process under the act.10 The district court
viewed the factual allegations as sufficient to charge a fraudulent scheme
in the issuance of the stock. However, it dismissed the complaint in
reliance on a recent Second Circuit decision, Howard v. Furst,"' which
held that specific corporate remedies in the Securities Exchange Act
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security." 17 C.F.R. § 24o.iob-5 (9-g).
' The facts as alleged by plaintiff, and deemed to be established for the purposes of
ruling upon defendants' motion to dismiss, tended to show that defendants, former
officers and the general counsel of Consolidated, had formed a vehicle corporation
through which spurious contract rights were to be transferred for Consolidated stock.
The shares were procured from Consolidated's transfer agent with falsely certified
corporate resolutions approving their transfer to the vehicle corporation. Before this
transaction was completed, the vehicle corporation was dissolved, and new stock was
issued in the name of its distributees. These shares were then sold by defendants to
individual investors throughout the world.
'0 Section 27 of the act provides that any action arising under the statute may be
brought in "the district wherein any act or transaction constituting the violation
occurred . . .or in the district wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant
or transacts business, and process . . . may be served in any other district of which-
the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be found." 48 Stat. 9oz
(934), 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1958).
1"238 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. deltied, 353 U.S. 937 (957). There, a
shareholder brought suit against the corporation and its directors to enjoin voting of
proxies obtained by allegedly fraudulent proxy statements and to recover damages on
behalf of the corporation for wasting its assets. In affirming the district court's dis-
missal of the complaint, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated: "[T]he
statute authorizes the formulation of rules and regulations 'in the public interest or for
the protection of investors.' There is literally nothing to support the view that any
substantive rights were created for the benefit of the corporation. The Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 is a comprehensive piece of legislaiion of wide scope. Significantly,
where it was intended to create a right of action in favor of the issuer corporation, the
statute makes express provision therefor." 238 F.2d at 793.
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precluded -the existence of a substantive civil right of shareholders to
bring a derivative action under section 14(a)' 2 and its implementing
rule X-i4A-9 .' 3 In reversing the district court, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals limited Howard v. Furst to actions involving the
solicitation of proxies under section i4(a) of the act.14
Section io(b) of the 1934 act is inoperative in the absence of imple-
menting rules. It contains no specific provision for civil liability, but
makes unlawful the use of any deceptive device or contrivance in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of any security in contravention of
rules and regulations prescribed by the Commission "in the public
interest or for the protection of investors." Narrowly interpreted, this
language would appear to sanction a right of action only when the
seller or purchaser is an "investor." In Hooper, defendants argued
that because the corporation could not be an investor in its own un-
issued stock, it was not a member of the class intended to be protected
by the statute and, therefore, had no private right of action. However,
the court considered the test of appropriateness to be founded on two
bases, each of which justified the implementing rule. The inability of
plaintiff to assert a claim as an injured "investor" did not foreclose his
right to proceed under the alternative basis, as an injured member
of the class whose interests the statute was enacted to protect "in the
public interest."'" Recognizing that the broad purpose of this legisla-
tion is to protect those engaging in securities transactions by deterring
2 "It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of any national securities
exchange or otherwise to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy or
consent or authorization in respect of any security (other than an exempted security)
registered on any national securities exchange in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors." 8 Stat. 895 0934), i5 U.s.C. § 78n(a)
(t9ss).
21 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1949).
" "We find it unnecessary and undesirable to undertake any criticism either of that
decision or the comments made with respect to a civil action brought as a stockholders'
derivative suit alleging a violation of § i4(a) and Rule X-14A- 9 on solicitation of
proxies. We decline, as we think that Court would, to read into its language a holding
that a corporation injured by a sale or purchase of securities has no private right of
action under § io(b) and X-xoB-5." 282 F.2d at 203.
- " The general rule is that no civil liability is incurred for violation of a statute
enacted to protect the interests of the general public. See RESTATEMENT, TorTS § 288
(1§35). Thus, plaintiff must show a special injury resulting from the violation if




fraudulent schemes perpetrated through channels of interstate com-
merce, the court concluded: "[A] person who parts with stock owned
by him as the result of fraudulent practices wrought on him by his pur-
chaser sustains an adverse impact that differentiates him from the
damage suffered by the public generally."'"
Having determined that the corporation was a person whose in-
terests section io(b) was enacted to protect, the court next faced the
question of whether its claim came within the scope of rule X-ioB-5.
In order to state a claim under the rule, it must be shown that defendant
has engaged in fraudulent conduct in connection with a purchase or sale
of a security "by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities
exchange." 7 The plaintiff's allegations were dearly sufficient to charge
a fraudulent scheme within the meaning of the rulei' 8 the corporation
was a "person" under the statute,'9 and the stock issued by it was a
"security."2" The only jurisdictional question remaining was whether
the transaction resulting in the issuance of Consolidated's stock was a
"sale." 2' Defendants obtained the stock from Consolidated's transfer
agent with falsely certified corporate resolutions purporting to approve
exchange of the stock in consideration for contract rights possessed by
defendants. Before the transaction, this stock had an economic value
to Consolidated equal to the proceeds that could be realized on issue.
After the transaction Consolidated no longer had the stock, although
apparently it had acquired contract rights represented to be com-
mensurate in value. Since section 3(a)(14)22 provides that the terms
"sale" and "sell" shall include any contract to sell "or otherwise dis-
pose of [securities]," the court concluded: "If this is not a sale in
the strict common law traditional sense, it certainly amounted to an
arrangement in which Consolidated 'otherwise dispose[d] of' its
16 zz F.2d at 2o2.
17 17 C.F.R. 24o.Iob-5 (949).
is 282 F.zd at zoo. The sufficiency of the allegations of fraud under FED. R. Cv.
P. 9 was not challenged. Supra at 199.
1948 Stat. 882 (934), 15 U.s.c. § 78c(a)(9) (1958).
2048 Stat. 882 (i934), i5 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(,o) (1958).
2 Defendants contended that there was no sale or purchase because the vehicle
corporation had been dissolved before the transfer was completed and the management
of Consolidated was unaware of the transaction. A novel argument in support of
defendants' position was based on plaintiff's allegations that defendants had stolen the
stock. Brief for Appellee, pp. 9-x x.
2248 Stat. 882 (1934.), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(04) (958).
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stock." Finding that the corporation met the requirements necessary
to establish its status as a person intended to be protected by section
io(b) and rule X-ioB-5, the court held that its trustee in bankruptcy
was a proper party to proceed under the statute in asserting its tort claim.
Of course, judicial cognizance of a civil remedy in tort when
statutorily proscribed conduct results in injury to a member of the
class whose interests the statute was enacted to protect, even where the
statute prescribes only criminal sanctions, is not a novel concept.2 4
Despite conceptual controversy, ample precedent sustains its applicability
in actions arising under section io(b) and rule X-ioB-. 25 The Hooper
23 287 F.zd at 203.
"Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), discussed in Note, Federal Jurisdiction
in Suits For Damages Under Statutes Not Affording Such Remedy, 48 CoLum. L. REV.
lo9o (1948)5 Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.zd 691 (2d Cir. 194.7), discussed in
Note, The Use of Criminal Statutes in the Creation of New Torts, 48 COLUM. L. REV.
456 (1948)5 RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 286-88 (1935); Lowndes, Civil Liability
Created by Criminal Legislation, x6 MINN. L. REV. 362 (1932) ; Morris, The Relation
of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability, 46 HARv. L. REV. 453 (1933); Thayer, Public
Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARV. L. REV. 317 (1914).
"Since neither § io(b) nor rule X-ioB-5 expressly provides for civil liability
or a private right of action, this tort concept represents a judicial extension of their
applicability. Opponents of extension argue that the purpose of the act, as revealed
in § z, does not comprehend isolated transactions but expresses a primary concern
with the operations of professionals in organized markets. See Latty, The Aggrieved
Buyer or Seller or Holder of Shares in a Close Corporation Under the S.E.C. Statutes,
18 LAw & CONTEMP. PkOB. 505, 510 (2953); Comment, 52 MIcH. L. REV. 893
(1954); Note, 64 HARe. L. REV. 1o8 (1951). However, there is nothing in the
wording of § io(b) which suggests its limitation to organized markets, and de-
fendants have been unsuccessful in asserting this construction in actions arising under
the 'section and rule. See, e.g., Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512
(E.D. Pa. 2946). This "narrow market' concept appears to conflict with courts'
repeated application of § 17(a) of the Securities Act, upon which rule X-ioB- 5 is
p'afterned, to private transactions. Bowen v. United States, 153 F.zd 747 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 328 U.S. 835 (1946); United States v. Monjar, 247 F.2d 926 ( 3 d Cir.
x94-4), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 859 (1945).
Another argument against extension is that rule X-xoB-5 was promulgated merely
to extend to sellers the protection afforded buyers under § 17(a) and since courts
have not been prone to imply a civil remedy under § 17(a), no such remedy should be
available to claimants seeking redress under § xo(b) and rule X-roB-5 in the absence of
specific provision. See Note, 59 HARv. L. REV. 769, 779 (946). A comparison of the
two statutes, however, reveals that under the 2933 Act the buyer is afforded specific civil
remcies under § x where false registration statements are involved and in connection
with false or misleading prospectuses and communications under § 12, whereas no such
all-embracing civil liability provisions exist in the 1934 Act. Section 9 (e) imposes
liability for manipulation of securities registered on an exchange, § z8 imposes liability
for misleading statements in documents filed with the SEC, and § 16(b) is concerned
with insiders' short-swing profits. Thus, it is apparent that the scope of these sections is
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decision contributes to this body of precedent by emphasizing that the
broad purpose of legislation of this type is to provide a means of policing
all securities transactions conducted through channels of interstate
commerce. By providing redress for a corporation defrauded int&
issuing stock not regularly traded in any market or exchange this
"broad purpose" may well comprehend the extension of these statutory
sanctions to any case involving a transfer of securities in which it is
alleged that a fraud has been perpetrated by employing either directly
or indirectly a means or instrumentality of interstate commerce.", This
decision represents a significant step in that direction.
much less comprehensive than that of §§ ix and xz of the 1933 Act, which may account
for the implication of civil remedies under other sections of the 1934. Act as a comple-
ment to its narrow civil liability provisions. For a comparison of the two statutes, see
Comment, 59 YALE L.J. 1i2o (195o) ; see also, White, From the Frying Pan into the
Fire: Swindlers and the Securities Acts, 45 A.B.A.J. iz9 (x959). Thus, § 2 9 (b) which
makes contracts in violation of the statute or any rule thereunder "void" has been held to.
imply a private right of action. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 52 (E.D.
Pa. x946). Similarly, private rights of action have been recognized under § 6(b) : Baird
v. Franklin, x1x F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 3z3 U.S. 737 (x944) § 7(a)-(d):
Remar v. Clayton Sec. Corp., 8 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Mass. x949)5 §§ ix(d) (2) and
17(a): Hawkins v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, 85 F. Supp. 104 (W..D.
Ark. 1949); § xS(c) (x): Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
26See Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 ( 9 th Cir. x956), criticized in Comment,
9 STAN. L. REV. 589 (1957), and Note, 7o HARv. L. REv. 1309 (1957).
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